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Introduction 
Methods for combining the experience and knowledge of people is certainly not a novel idea. For example, 
Doug Englebart created a laboratory at the then Stanford Research Institute in the early 1960's to explore 
the use of computers to augment the human intellect. He had a particular interest in high-performance 
teams and became one of the first pioneers of computer-supported teamwork (Englebart, 1963). In the late 
1960's, Thomas Sheridan headed the MIT Community Dialog Project which used electronic voting 
technology and specially designed meeting procedures to enable participants to make anonymous coded 
responses to questions posed by a moderator or other participants (e.g., Sheridan, 1974; Rouse and 
Sheridan, 1974). However, it is the emergence of group support systems that has allowed groups to 
consider non-trivial problems in real-time and in much shorter time frames than heretofore possible.  
Whereas earlier research focused on processes that effectively extracted information from or aggregated 
opinions in decisional groups, the focus of recent GSS research has been on the group's interaction and 
communication. However, supported groups only rarely continue their interaction until a consensus is 
reached. In the interest of saving time and of efficiency, groups almost invariably aggregate members' 
opinions by formal means. Surprisingly, technologies that aggregate opinions and procedures that augment 
the use of knowledge within groups have received little research attention; and the procedures that have 
been implemented in even the most advanced GSS are relatively unsophisticated. Typical methods are 
plurality voting, summing of ranks (or a weighted sum of ranks), averaging of estimates, etc. These formal 
methods meet the usual criteria of preserving anonymity, granting equal treatment to members and 
mitigating the effects of irrelevant influences, but they fail to allow members to make full use of all the 
potential information in the group.  
Can formal decision methods encourage an incremental usage of knowledge and lead to better group 
outcomes? Though it is a generally accepted conclusion that communication leads to consensus-building, 
the primary research objective of evaluating the effect of the formal method as a synthesizer of knowledge 
is a much more precise endeavor. At this stage the interaction and communication has ceased and members 
must "decide," usually with incomplete knowledge. Further, GSS-based decision tools are inefficient 
because they harvest only one dimension of knowledge. 
Research Issues 
Figure 1 depicts the multiple dimensions of knowledge members of a group bring to a given problem and 
the "strategy spaces" available to them by different formal methods. Strategy spaces define the possible 
interactions between knowledge, voting method, and voting strategy. Knowledge refers to what participants 
know about the issue and about the group itself. Voting method refers to the actual algorithm the group 
chooses to translate knowledge into an outcome. Voting strategy refers to tactics used by voters to best 
translate their knowledge into voting patterns. Each voting method delineates a different strategy space. 
Simple voting mechanisms, like percentage voting, require evaluations of alternatives only. For these 
methods, a participant must resolve whether votes should be spread over many alternatives or focused on 
the best ones. The algorithms discussed in this paper, called influence allocation processes or IAP, require 
evaluations of alternatives and participants (Balthazard and Gargeya, 1995). In this larger strategy space, 
the participant must resolve the spread over alternatives and participants, and then resolve which of these 
two evaluations should be emphasized to best represent his/her knowledge. With members having the 
opportunity to spell out their knowledge in finer granularity within IAP, these algorithms may hide an 
untapped potential for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of group decision making.  
To explain IAP, consider the selection of an alternative. Suppose member 1 is uncertain of member 2's 
choice, but knows that 2 is the best qualified to decide. In this situation member 1 would like to vote the 
same way as 2, but may not know what that is. Influence allocation processes allow member 1 to give 
influence to member 2 to be used in the same manner as 2's own influence. 
 
 
Figure 1 Possible Voting Strategy Spaces  
Simple group weighting, in which members indicate the weight which they think each member's opinion 
ought to be given in the group output, these weights being averaged, allows for problems of this sort. 
However, a member may not know the member best qualified, but yet may know a member who does 
know. In making an allocation, then, one is potentially exercising judgment about a member's qualifications 
to influence the decision and about a member's qualifications to judge who is qualified. In principle, of 
course, this could continue to an infinite series of judgments about others' qualifications to judge others' 
qualifications to judge, etc. 
Two specific IAP algorithms are examined here. In SPAN, originally presented by MacKinnon (1966), 
each member starts with a number of votes that may be allocated among one or more of the other members 
of the group and/or among one or more of a set of discrete alternatives. The votes a member receives from 
others are passed on according to the same initial allocation. Under suitable conditions, this iterative 
process converges with everybody's votes assigned to the alternatives, thereby ranking them or selecting 
one alternative to be the group choice. In an extended version proposed by Ferrell (1992), here called 
XSPAN, members may make up to three allocations to each other member, resulting in three separate 
allocation matrices in addition to the matrix representing allocation to the alternatives. The three kinds of 
allocation are: 1) votes for a representative to give to the various alternatives in the proportions used for the 
representative's own allocation to alternatives, 2) votes for a representative to pass on to other members to 
use with the same restrictions as were applied to the representative's own allocation to others, and 3) votes 
that are not restricted, that are to be distributed by the representative in the proportions that the 
representative originally chose. XSPAN is worthwhile only if group members can make use of the method's 
potential capacity to articulate their knowledge of the differences between member knowledge of others 
and member knowledge of the alternatives. 
The structure of these processes can be represented as absorbing Markov chains, a fact that is useful for 
analyzing the process mathematically, tallying the vote, and to compute various measures of performance. 
Knowledge use can generically be measured by examining how IAP outperform traditional voting methods. 
Also, one can judge the effectiveness of XSPAN's option to designate the use of votes given to others by 
calculating whether a larger fraction of the indirect vote is then allocated to the correct alternative than with 
SPAN. To study this issue, the following experiment was conducted. 
Research Study 
A group of 5 acquaintances met on two occasions. The first meeting, in the form of a structured group 
interview, served to exchange information about the different knowledge within the group and to define the 
boundaries of questioning for the exercise. Between the meetings, the facilitator created a set of 30 single-
answer multiple-choice questions representative of the group's knowledge domain. At the second meeting, 
the participants considered the questions and used percentage voting, SPAN, and XSPAN in random 
sequence to achieve a group consensus decision on each question.  
To compare how well the formal methods harvest knowledge the measures of individual performance 
derived from the Markov process were computed. From these measures, and the outcomes of the voting 
processes, the following hypotheses were tested:  
H1: There is no difference in the weights allocated to correct solutions between percentage voting, SPAN 
and XSPAN in appropriate problems. 
H2: There is no difference in the proportion of direct votes to the correct alternatives between SPAN and 
XSPAN in appropriate problems. 
H3: There is no difference in the proportion of indirect votes to the correct alternatives between SPAN and 
XSPAN in appropriate problems. 
Of the 30 original questions considered, 8 were discarded because no one in the group obtained the correct 
answer. Hence, 22 questions were kept. SPAN and XSPAN allocated more weight than percentage voting 
(F(1,42)=45.35, p<0.001 for SPAN; F(1,42)=38.79, p<0.001 for XSPAN). To compare the weights of 
SPAN and XSPAN, only the situations when the vote designation feature of XSPAN was actually used by 
the participants were compared. A 10% "usage threshold" (10% of the vote was designated) was chosen to 
depict a thoughtful use of the designated indirect votes. Of the 22 questions, 14 had over 10% of their 
allocations directed towards designated indirect votes. In such situations when XSPAN was used in earnest 
by the members it was found to be more effective at allocating weight to the correct solution than SPAN 
(F(1,26)=54.14,p<0.0001).  
To examine this finding, the 14 XSPAN matrices were reconstituted into new SPAN matrices and 
compared with the original SPAN using two-sided t-tests. This test was conducted to detect a similar effect 
to that observed in value trees where allocations are different because more weight is allocated to more 
elaborate areas of the trees. In XSPAN, there are three times more opportunities to allocate indirect votes 
than in SPAN. It was found that the new SPAN formed from XSPAN still outperformed the old SPAN 
(t=1.95 > ta=1.78), which suggests that the improvement is not due to a simple increase in correct indirect 
allocations.  
The Markovian measures were then compared for individuals allocating more than 10% of their votes to 
designated indirect votes. In the 88 personal vote vectors (1 vector per person for each question), 21 vectors 
had more than a 10% commitment to designated votes. Due to its potential capacity to better articulate 
knowledge in the group and the previous finding, it was fully expected that XSPAN would outperform 
SPAN on its usage of the information. Using a one sided t-test (a=0.05, df=20, t=1.72) it was found that 
XSPAN had a significant advantage over SPAN for member i's relative indirect allocation to correct 
alternative (denoted EI; t(EI)=1.80>1.72), member i's indirect allocation to others that is then allocated 
directly to the correct alternative (denoted AKC; t(AKC)=1.96>1.72), member i's total indirect allocation to 
others that then allocate directly to any alternative (denoted AK; t(AK)=1.91>1.72), and member i's 
relative indirect allocation to others that then allocate directly to the correct alternative (denoted EK; 
t(EK)=2.41>1.72). Hence the superiority of XSPAN in weighting the correct alternative is due largely to an 
increase in the proportion of votes given to others - an incremental use of knowledge. 
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